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IV

I. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This Court granted the Writ of Certiorari filed by Appellant Mleads Enterprises,
Inc. ("Mleads") as to the following issue:
Whether due process permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who sends
an email without knowledge of the residence of the recipient or the location at
which the recipient will retrieve the message.
This appeal presents the issue of law, (see Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, p. 2
(1999)), of whether a finding of personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of a single email
that was unknowingly accessed in Utah, without any other contacts whatever, violates the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Utah's long-arm statute.
III. STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE
APPEAL
1.

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution (reproduced at
Appendix 1 hereto).
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a plaintiffs attempt to hale into court an Arizona-based

company that has no contacts with the State of Utah and which did not direct any activity
to the State of Utah, but sent a single email that was accessed from Utah. Brittney Fenn
("Fenn") alleged $10 in statutory injuries pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 13-16-101 to 105
5

(Supp. 2002) (the "Statute")) from a single e-mail (the "E-mail"). The record is
undisputed that the Email was sent by a vendor of Mleads and that Mleads "Mleads did
not know specifically that [its] agent would send an email to Fenn or to any Utah
resident."
The trial court granted Mleads's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Mleads did
not know, and could not have reasonably anticipated, the E-mail would reach the state of
Utah or its residents. (R. 88, District Court Order ^| 19.) The Utah Court of Appeals
reversed and vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that "[s]ending one email to
a resident of Utah is sufficient 'contact' to satisfy . . . the minimum contacts requirement
of due process." The Court of Appeals' "single email rule" contravenes the purposeful
availment requirements of the Due Process Clause and allows a non-resident defendant to
be brought into this forum based on random and attenuated contacts. As Judge Bench
articulated, "It is difficult to imagine a more attenuated contact than the one presented
here: a single email message sent to a lone Utah recipient." Accordingly, Mleads
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mleads is an eight (8) employee closely held Arizona corporation that generates
leads (i.e., expressions of interest by a potential customer) with respect to mortgage and
home loans. (R. 29 fl| 2 (Declaration of Shay Tyler (hereinafter "Tyler Decl.")).) Mleads
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generally contracts with third parties (the "Marketing Companies" or in this instance the
"Marketing Company") to promote its services to end users who "opt-in" or affirmatively
consent to receive information regarding Mleads services. (R. 29; Tyler Decl. f 3.)
Mleads does not at any time (except for following the submission of a consumer's
application to receive information from Mleads, or upon receipt of an unsubscribe
request) learn any information regarding the locale, identity, or other information of a
consumer—Mleads does not learn the identity, any contact information, or location of
consumers prior to the transmission of messages by the Marketing Companies. (R. 29;
Tyler Decl. f 4.) The Marketing Companies, who are not agents or employees of Mleads,
warrant and represent to Mleads that at all times, including when transmitting
promotional messages and e-mails, the Marketing Companies comply with all relevant
laws and regulations. (R. 29; Tyler Decl. ^ 3.) Upon receiving promotions (e.g., e-mail)
regarding Mleads, a consumer may fill out an application requesting more information
regarding a particular loan and transmit such information to Mleads. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^
5.) Mleads then provides the consumer's information on a batch (non-individual) basis to
a financial institution which then contacts the consumer regarding a proposed loan. (R.
30; Tyler Decl. % 6.)
Mleads lacks a single contact with the State of Utah. Mleads maintains an office
solely in the State of Arizona and does not maintain any offices in the State of Utah.
(R. 29; Tyler Decl. Tf 2.) Mleads is not licensed to conduct business in the State of Utah.
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(R. 29; Tyler Decl. ^ 3.) Mleads does not employ any Utah-based employees or agents.
(R. 29; Tyler Decl. ^ 3.) Mleads does not recruit any employees or agents in the State of
Utah. Mleads does not have any bank accounts in the State of Utah. (R. 29-30; Tyler
Decl. Tf 4.) Mleads does not maintain any telephone or facsimile numbers, or list any
telephone or facsimile numbers in the State of Utah. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^ 5.) Mleads
does not advertise in any Utah newspapers or magazines or other Utah-based media or
otherwise solicit business in the State of Utah. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^ 6.) Mleads does not
have any Utah-based shareholders. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^ 7.) Mleads does not own or
lease any property in the State of Utah. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^f 8.) None of Mleads's
employees have traveled to Utah on business. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. U 9.) Mleads is not
subject to taxation in the State of Utah. (R. 30-31; Tyler Decl. ^ 10.) Finally, Mleads
does not generate any substantial percentage of its revenues from activities in the State of
Utah. (R. 31; Tyler Decl. ^j 11.) In sum, Mleads has no contacts with the State of Utah.
The sole alleged contact in this case is the E-mail, which the Marketing Company
transmitted to Fenn, and which Fenn affirmatively consented to receive and fortuitously
accessed while in the State of Utah. (R. 31; Tyler Decl. ^f 12.)
B.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

1.

Trial court proceedings.

Fenn filed this lawsuit on January 3, 2003, alleging a violation of the Statute
arising from the Email sent to the email address <BAF@heartslc.com>. (R. 2,
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Complaint.) Fenn did not allege any economic, physical, emotional, or dignitary damages
from the E-mail. The Complaint contained a sole allegation ostensibly relating to
jurisdiction:
Defendant sent, or caused to be sent, to plaintiff an unsolicited commercial email.
(R. 86, District Court Order, ^ 9.) Mleads, having no contacts with the State of Utah,
brought a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Motion to Dismiss
was accompanied by the declaration of Shay Tyler ("Tyler Declaration"), principal of
Mleads. As noted by the District Court, the Tyler Declaration attested that Mleads:
(a) does not maintain any offices in the State of Utah, (b) does not transact any
business in the State of Utah, (c) is not licensed to do Business in the State of
Utah, (d) does not employ or recruit any employees or agents in Utah, (e) does
not have any bank accounts in Utah, (f) does not maintain telephone or
facsimile numbers in Utah, (g) does not advertise or solicit business in Utah,
(h) does not have any shareholders in Utah, (i) does not pay taxes in Utah,
[and] (j) does not generate any substantial percentage of its revenues from
activities in Utah.
(R. 85, District Court Order, ^ 6.) Fenn filed a responsive pleading without any
accompanying evidence or testimony—i.e., Fenn "rested on the very general factual
allegations made in [the] Complaint." (R. 85, District Court Order, \ 8.) Fenn instead
relied on the argument that Mleads had somehow waived its jurisdictional argument by
appearing generally. Fenn further argued that the Statute itself conferred jurisdiction, and
that Fenn's general allegations were sufficient to find jurisdiction. (R. 86, District Court
Order, TI10.)
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The District Court rejected Fenn's arguments that jurisdiction was conferred by the
Statute (R. 86, District Court Order, Tf 13.) or that Mleads had waived its jurisdictional
argument by not making a special appearance. (R. 86, District Court Order, ^ 11.) The
District Court considered the minimal jurisdictional allegations of the Complaint, along
with the allegations of Tyler Declaration, which, because they were not controverted by
specific allegations, were taken as true. The District Court concluded, based on these
operative facts, that personal jurisdiction was not present in this case. (R. 88; District
Court Order, Tl 10.)
2.

The decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals considered the issue of "whether the state can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who caused one unsolicited commercial e-mail to
be sent to a resident of the state." Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2004 UT App. 412,
p. 3, 103 P.3d 156 (2004). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that "Mleads did not
know specifically that the agent would send an email to Fenn or to any Utah resident."
Fenn, 2004 UT App. 412 p. 2. The court did not end its inquiry there. The court instead
focused on the volitional aspect of Mleads's transmission of the E-mail, which it viewed
as determinative:
The extent to which defendant caused the result is the more important aspect
of the analysis. Mleads caused its agent to send email, and the agent sent an
email to Fenn, who is a resident of Utah. The record does not disclose whether
the agent sent a large volume of email all over the country or whether it sent
one email to Fenn specifically. In either case, Mleads directed its agent to
solicit business, and that direction instantiates the purpose that makes the
10

connection more than an "attenuated nexus."
Fenn, 2004 UT App. 412, p. 21. In the view of the Court of Appeals, jurisdiction was
appropriate because Mleads took voluntary action, regardless of whether that action was
aimed at the State of Utah.
Judge Bench dissented from the decision of the Court of Appeals. Although Judge
Bench did not write an opinion accompanying his dissenting vote he explained his
reasoning in a different case:
I dissented in Fenn because I do not believe that a single email can vest Utah
with personal jurisdiction over the defendant-sender where the
plaintiff-recipient alleges no injury resulting from the transmission of the
email. In order to satisfy the jurisdictional inquiry, due process requires that a
nonresident defendant "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235,253,2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958). This "requirement ensures
that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of. . .
'attenuated1 contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,475,85
L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984)).
It is difficult to imagine a more attenuated contact than the one presented here:
a single email message sent to a lone Utah recipient. Here, as in Fenn, there is
no allegation "that the email caused any reputational, economic, emotional, or
physical 'injury.'" Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at P20. In both cases, the plaintiffs
allege only statutory damages often dollars. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105
(Supp. 2003)
To craft its single email rule, the Fenn majority relied in part on Starways, Inc.
v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, 980 P.2d 204. In Starways, the Utah Supreme Court
held that the nonresident defendants' alleged transmission of libelous
facsimiles vested Utah with jurisdiction. Id. at P9. Although the Fenn majority
recognized that the absence of alleged injury in Fenn distinguished it from
Starways, the majority concluded that this distinction was unimportant. Fenn,
2004 UT App 412 at PP20-21. However, I believe that Starways should
11

prevent Utah from taking jurisdiction over cases where no injury is alleged.
The single email rule established by Fenn therefore improperly ignores the
"'quality and nature'" of the defendant's contact, vesting jurisdiction based
solely on a single contact within Utah, however trivial. Starways, 1999 UT 50
at P8 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319,90 L.
Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945)). Thus, contrary to the view of my colleagues, I
believe that intentional contact alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Moreover, the principle of judicial deference to legislative determinations
should play no role in our due process inquiry.
Weaver v. Directlink Media Group, LLC, 2004 UT App 471 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)
(unpublished decision). This Court granted Mleads's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on
March 17, 2005.
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Court reviews this appeal of a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction de novo. Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, p. 2 (1999). Id.
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Due Process requires that the foreign defendant purposefully avail itself of the
forum state. The only evidence on appeal of any such purposeful action by Mleads is a
single email sent by a vendor of Mleads which Mleads had no knowledge or reason to
know would be received in Utah. A "single email rule" is contrary to well established
Due Process principles and is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
///
///

VIII. ARGUMENT
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A.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REQUIRES PURPOSEFUL
DIRECTION OF ACTIVITY TOWARD THE FORUM STATE OR PLAINTIFF

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution limits a state's power to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. U.S. Const, amend. XIV. "[The] constitutional touchstone of the
determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process [is]
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state."
Asahi Metal Indus, Co, v. California, 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92
(1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Arguello v.
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co,, 838 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992) (quoting
International Shoe Co, v, Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1995)).
1.

Minimum contacts requires purposeful direction.

The minimum contacts requirement serves to protect a defendant against the
burden of litigation in a distant or inconvenient forum, and to ensure that states do not
reach beyond the limits of sovereignty imposed by their role in the federal system.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp, v, Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed.
2d 490 (1980). As noted by the Court of Appeals in this case, "[a] democratic
government must exercise its powers against only those who have in some way assented
to the governmental power." Fenn, 2004 UT 412 p. 14. Under United States Supreme
Court precedent, the minimum contacts underlying the assertion of jurisdiction must have
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some basis in the non-resident defendant's purposeful actions within the forum state, or
directed towards the forum state. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 812, 104 S. Ct.
1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984). The purposeful availment requirement ensures that
defendants will not be "haled into a jurisdiction through 'random,' fortuitous,' or
'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 104 S. Ct.
1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1985). The operative term "purposeful" clearly contemplates
some knowledge or intentionality requirement of the defendant vis a vis the forum state.
2.

Mleads lacked minimum contacts in this case.

The present case presents an extreme example of a non-resident defendant who is
haled into court based on a completely random, fortuitous or attenuated contact. The
Record indicates Mleads itself does not have any contacts with the State of Utah, and
Mleads hired the Marketing Company (based in the state of Florida) to assist in business
promotion. (R. 28, Tyler Declaration, ^ 3.) Marketing Company assured Mleads that at
all times Marketing Company complied with relevant laws. (R. 28, Tyler Declaration,
U 3.) Additionally, Marketing Company did not provide to Mleads the locale of the end
users to which the Marketing Company directs its promotion or advertising efforts or any
other specific information regarding consumers, including their state of residence. (R.
28-9, Tyler Declaration, ^f 4.) Marketing Company did not provide any such information
even when Mleads requested. (R. 29, Tyler Declaration, f 4.) Mleads was never aware
of Fenn's identity, location, or state of residence before Fenn sued Mleads in Utah. (R.
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29, Tyler Declaration, ^ 4.) Fenn did not put forth any evidence indicating, or even
allege, that Mleads sold any product or services, directly marketed any product or
services, or advertised any product or services to consumers in the State of Utah, or ever
contemplated marketing here. The Email itself was sent to a location-neutral address,
<BAF@heartslc.com>. (R. 2, Complaint.) The uncontroverted fact dispositive in this
case is Mleads did not know any promotions would ever reach the state of Utah. Indeed,
the Court of Appeals noted that "Mleads did not know specifically that the agent would
send an email to Fenn or to any Utah resident." Thus, Mleads did not undertake any
purposeful act to avail itself to the laws and benefits of the State of Utah; nor did Mleads
direct any actions towards the State of Utah or its residents, including Fenn. Jurisdiction
is thus not proper under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

3.

Application of traditional jurisdictional principles requires reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with personal jurisdiction and
Due Process jurisprudence. Merely because the subject of this lawsuit pertains to
communications over a global distribution mechanism, the Internet, does not justify
modification centuries old jurisprudence. Courts and commentators have repeatedly
cautioned that traditional principles of jurisdiction should not be abandoned in
cyberspace. See e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1160 (D. Wis. 2004) ("traditional principles of due process are sufficient to decide
15

personal jurisdiction questions in the internet context"); Design88 Ltd. v. Power Uptik
Prods., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21042 (D. Va. 2000) ("orthodox principles of in personam
jurisdiction simply did not wholly evaporate into cyberspace"); Hon. Frank H.
Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. Cm. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996)
(counseling against developing specialized tests for cyberspace). Indeed, "[s]ince a
defendant's Internet activity is not different from activity in real space, the Internet is not
so different that it requires the application of new or technology-specific rules." Titi
Nguyen, A Survey ofPersonalJurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A Return to
Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 519, 541 (2004).
The United States Supreme Court expressly held that a non-resident distributor
cannot be haled into court in a locale merely because one of its products happened to
reach the locale. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. California, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026,
94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1986). In Asahi, the Supreme Court reiterated the purposeful availment
requirement, stressing that Due Process requires some conscious action on the part of the
non-resident defendant which is directed towards the forum state. Asahi also stands for
the proposition that a non-resident defendant cannot be subject to jurisdiction in a state
based on its release of instrumentalities into the stream of commerce that happen to reach
the forum state and cause injury in the forum state.
Asahi involved the state of California's attempt to assert jurisdiction over Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. ("Asahi"), a Japanese company. Asahi manufactured a tube
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assembly that found its way into a motorcycle tire that exploded while being driven by a
California resident in California. The Supreme Court found that the State of California
could not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi, notwithstanding
Asahi's awareness that the tube assembly may find its way to California. The Court
relied on the fact that Asahi had not taken "any action to purposefully avail itself of the
California market." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed that the
connection between the non-resident defendant and the forum state "must come about by
an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id (emphasis
added):
Assuming, arguendo, that respondents have established Asahi's awareness that
some of the valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes
sold in California, respondents have not demonstrated any action by Asahi to
purposefully avail itself of the California market. Asahi does not do business
in California. It has no office, agents, employees, or property in California. It
does not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California. It did not create,
control, or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to California.
There is no evidence that Asahi designed its product in anticipation of sales in
California. On the basis of these facts, the exertion of personal jurisdiction
over Asahi by the Superior Court of California exceeds the limits of due
process.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted).
Mleads is in the same position as Asahi; and the email Fenn received is similar to
Asahi's tube assembly. Asahi sold its tube assemblies to tire manufacturers (who then
sold the tires to motorcycle manufacturers) and could not predict the states in which the
tube assemblies may cause injuries. Likewise, in this case Mleads did not direct the E-
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mail to Utah or to Fenn in particular; and Mleads could not have predicted a Utah resident
would receive the E-mail here. The United States Supreme Court held that Asahi did not
subject itself to jurisdiction in the State of California for an accident that happened to
occur in California from Asahi's product. The Court ruled that jurisdiction was not
proper because Asahi did not intentionally direct its product to the State of California.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107-08. The Court noted that Asahi knew some tube assemblies would
find their way to California; but, the Court would not allow for personal jurisdiction
because Asahi did not direct its activities to California. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 104. Like
Asahi, Mleads did not direct its activities to Utah. Additionally, Mleads did not know any
emails would reach Utah. Accordingly, pursuant to Asahi, jurisdiction is not proper in
this case.
4.

Transmission of e-mail alone, without prior knowledge of the
recipient's state of residence, cannot support jurisdiction.

The sender of an e-mail has no ability to differentiate from what location in the
world an e-mail will be accessed. See Hydro Engineering, Inc. v. Landa, Inc., 231 F.
Supp. 2d 1130,1136, fn. 1 (CD. Utah 2002) ("[e-mail] addresses [do] not identify the
particular state in which the e-mail was actually received, opened"^ (emphasis added).
Fenn could have accessed her e-mail via any world wide web-enabled device located in
any city, state or country on the planet. Even if Mleads or Marketing Company intended
the E-mail to be accessed in the State of Utah, neither Marketing Company nor Mleads
could control where the recipients accessed such e-mails. Kaempe v. Myers, 2001 U.S.
18

Dist. LEXIS 18386 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting the absence of control over the location of
receipt of e-mail because an "e-mail could have been retrieved from anywhere in the
world") (emphasis added). Thus, where the record does not contain evidence that the
non-resident defendant knew of the state of plaintiff s residence prior to sending an email, the transmission of a single e-mail, without more, cannot form sufficient basis for
jurisdiction.
B.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT REQUIRES PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT

1.

This Court has rejected jurisdiction based on random acts.

Utah courts,1 following the United States Supreme Court, have similarly required
purposeful availment as a prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction. For example, in
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court noted that
the assertion of personal jurisdiction requires

1

Federal courts sitting in Utah have reached similar results. In Stewart v.
Hennesey, the United States District Court for the District of Utah held that it could
properly assert jurisdiction over a non-resident automobile upgrade business due to the
e-mails and telephone conversations exchanged between the Utah plaintiff and the
non-resident defendant. Stewart v. Hennesey, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (D. Utah
2002). In relying on the e-mail based contacts between the Utah plaintiff and the
non-resident defendant the court distinguished between a non-residenfs act of making a
world wide website generally available and the act of intentionally communicating with
the plaintiff via the world wide website. The court noted that M[c]ourts have emphasized
'purposeful availment,5 . . . courts look for a purposeful act by which defendant avails
himself of the privileges and protections of the forum." Hennesey, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1203.
In Hennesey, the court concluded that jurisdiction was proper since the "defendant []
chose to do business through its website with the plaintiff." Id. In contrast, such
purposeful action is not present in this case.
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some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added). That case
involved a claim brought by a plaintiff against a California car dealership. Plaintiff
purchased the car in California and subsequently moved to Utah, where she sued the
California dealership. The Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was not proper
since the California car dealership had not directed any activities towards the State of
Utah or its residents and because the contact in question was brought about by an action
of the plaintiff rather than of the defendant. Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704,
706 (Utah 1974).
2.

Starways v. Curry Supports Reversal

The Court of Appeals improperly relied upon Starways v. Curry, 1999 UT 50
(1999) in reversing the decision of the trial court. Starways, a Utah business, alleged that
the foreign defendants libeled them "both in personal conversations and in nationally
broadcast facsimile transmissions." Id. at p. 5. Starways is factually distinguishable
from the present matter because the record in that case contained uncontroverted
allegations that the defendants caused facsimile transmissions to be sent to Utah and that
the defendants had personal conversions with individuals located in Utah. In the present
matter, however, the record is uncontroverted that Mleads had no knowledge that the
Email would be received in Utah and there were no additional facts supporting personal
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jurisdiction.
Moreover, this Court made clear that the decision in Starways would have been
different had the defendants merely intentionally sent a facsimile without knowledge that
the facsimile would be received in Utah. This Court articulated that
We note that it may ultimately become clear that defendants did not cause
defamatory facsimiles to be transmitted into Utah but did send them elsewhere
and that it was reasonably foreseeable that a copy would end up in Utah. Such
an attenuated nexus would not be sufficient, standing alone, to justify the
imposition of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Colder, 465 U.S.
at 789 ("The mere fact that [a defendant] can 'foresee' that [a defamatory
article] will be circulated and have an effect in [a state] is not sufficient for an
assertion of jurisdiction")
Starways, 1999 UT at p. 12, n3. The facts at bar present the circumstance distinguished
by this Court in Starways.
Judge Bench, the dissenting judge below, further distinguished Starways based on
the nature of the alleged injury. In this case, there is no allegation in this case that the
Email caused any "reputational, economic, emotional, or physical 'injury.'" Fenn, 2004
UT App 412 at P20. In Starways, in contrast, plaintiff alleged injury to its reputation
based upon defendants' allegations "that Starways was being sued for over one billion
dollars and that the contracts Starways has with its carrier and suppliers are illegal.
Starways, 1999 UT 50, plO, n2. Judge Bench's analysis recognizing the nature of the
injury in question should be adopted by this Court.
Finally, a claim based upon phone and facsimile communications is qualitatively
different than a claim based upon a single email communication. In Starways, the
21

defendants sent facsimiles and made phone calls to Utah. Communications made via
telephone lines necessarily include area codes, which reveal the location of the recipient.
By contrast, an email address is location-neutral and includes no information which
would give the sender reason to believe that the recipient was located in any particular
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Starways is factually distinguishable from the present matter.
Mleads had no "knowledge of the residence of the recipient or the location at which the
recipient will retrieve the message". Fenn v. Mleads, 2005 Utah LEXIS 42 (Utah, 2005)
(granting writ of certiorari). Moreover, the Starways decision expressly differentiated the
facts in that case from the case at bar and advised that, without evidence that the
communication would "end up in Utah", it would not be sufficient, standing alone, to
justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

C.

T H E COURT BELOW CONFLATED THE CONCEPTS OF VOLITION AND AIMING

The Court of Appeals found that Mleads did not intend for any email to reach
Utah. Nonetheless, it found jurisdiction because Mleads knew that email was being sent
somewhere. The Court of Appeals held:
Mleads directed its agent to solicit business, and that direction instantiates the
purpose that makes the connection more than an "attenuated nexus."
Fenn, 103 P.3d at 162. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals conflated the concepts of
volition (i.e., intending to send an email) and aiming (i.e., directing an email to Utah).
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See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Court of Appeals also misapplied the "effects" test.
1.

Volition and aiming are distinct concepts in the jurisdictional analysis.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 787 (9th Cir. 2004) is a
recent case that demonstrates that volition and aiming are distinct concepts in the
jurisdictional analysis. Schwarzenegger involved a lawsuit brought by California
governor Arnold Schwarzenegger who sued in California, and alleged that an Ohio car
dealership utilized his likeness without his permission. The dealership had no employees
or offices in the State of California, and otherwise did not transact any business there.
Governor Schwarzenegger argued that the dealership's acts of propagating the
advertisement was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting
that while the dealership committed an intentional act, the dealership did not "expressly
aim . . . its intentional act — the placement of the advertisement — in California."
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. The Ninth Circuit separated the intentional act and
express aiming analysis. According to the Ninth Circuit, jurisdiction is proper where
there is an intentional act which is also intended to have an effect in the forum state. In
that case, the two elements were not present, because "[the dealership's intentional act. . .
was expressly aimed at Ohio [where the advertisement aired] rather than California." Id.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Mleads did not intend the E-mail to be
sent to the State of Utah. See Fenn, 2004 UT App. 412, p. 2 ("Mleads did not know
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specifically that the agent would send an email to Fenn or any Utah resident."). Because
Mleads did not expressly aim its activities to Utah, jurisdiction is not proper. The fact
that Mleads caused the E-mail to be sent (i.e., "[t]he extent to which [Mleads] caused the
result of the important aspect of the analysis" Fenn, 2004 UT App. at p 21) is not
determinative. Rather, a foreign defendant must purposefully avail itself of the local
jurisdiction, not simply purposefully have conducted the act in question.
2.

The Court of Appeals recast and misapplied the effects test.

The focus of the Court of Appeals on "[t]he extent to which the defendant caused
the result" also misapplies the "effects" test set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804.
Calder involved a lawsuit brought by an entertainer who lived in California against
defendants who lived and worked in Florida. Plaintiff sued, alleging that she had been
libeled by an article published by defendants. Defendants argued that they should not be
subject to jurisdiction in California because they were not responsible for circulation of
the article in California. Defendants analogized themselves to the hypothetical welder
who works on a boiler which later explodes in California. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. The
Court disagreed, noting that "[defendants] are not charged with mere untargeted
negligence. Rather, their intentional.. . actions were expressly aimed at California." Id.
The Court relied on the fact that defendants knew that plaintiff (the subject of the
allegedly libelous article) lived and worked in California, and that defendants' magazine
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had the largest circulation in California. Id. Defendants' knowledge that their actions
would affect plaintiff in California {i.e., defendants' specific knowledge that plaintiff
lived and worked in California) and the fact that defendants knew that their libelous
article would be transmitted to California were determinative in Colder.
In this case, the Court of Appeals based jurisdiction on the fact that Mleads caused
the e-mail to be sent. Unlike in Colder, in this case, Mleads had no a priori knowledge
that the E-mail would harm Fenn in Utah. The Record is devoid of any evidence that a
large part of Mleads's marketing efforts were focused on Utah. Applying Colder's test
thus requires a finding of no jurisdiction.
D.

CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE REJECTED JURISDICTION IN
SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES

The majority of courts from other jurisdictions read the "effects" test set forth in
Colder v. Jones as requiring "purposeful availment". Many recent cases involving
actions taken, and injuries allegedly perpetrated, over the Internet, and which have had
occasion to apply Colder, hold that Due Process—regardless of the effect of defendant's
conduct—continues to require purposeful availment. See, e.g., Pavlovich v. Superior
Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 270, 58 P.3d 2, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002). In Pavlovich, the
California Supreme Court noted that "most courts agree that merely asserting that a
defendant knew or should have known that his intentional acts would cause harm in the
forum state is not enough to establish jurisdiction under [Calder's] effects test."
Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 270 (emphasis added). Pavlovich involved a lawsuit filed by the
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DVD Copy Control Association ("DVDCCA") against Matthew Pavlovich ("Pavlovich"),
a Texas resident. DVDCCA alleged that Pavlovich misappropriated DVDCCA trade
secrets by posting the source code of a program called DeCSS, which allowed users to
circumvent CSS (content scrambling system) technology which generally prevented the
playing of copyrighted motion pictures without the necessary algorithms and keys.
Pavlovich had never been to California and had no direct contacts with California, but
DVDCCA argued that since he knew or should have known that he harmed the motion
picture industry by posting DeCSS, he should anticipate being haled into a California
court. The California Supreme Court disagreed:
DVDCCA's argument therefore boils down to the following syllogism:
jurisdiction exists solely because Pavlovich's tortious conduct had a forseeable
effect in California. But mere forseeability is not enough for jurisdiction,
[citations omitted] Otherwise the commission of any intentional tort affecting
industries in California would subject a defendant to jurisdiction in California.
We decline to adopt such an expansive interpretation of the effects test.
Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 277 (emphasis added) (citing Callaway Golf Corp. v. Royal
Canadian GolfAss'n, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200 (CD. Cal. 2000) (findingjurisdiction
not proper against Canadian not-for-profit entity which allegedly libeled California
corporation based on Canadian entity's presumed knowledge of California plaintiffs
location and principal place of business) ("Merely knowing that a corporate [plaintiff]
might be located in California does not fulfill the effects test.")).
Many other recent cases have similarly rejected an expansive reading of Calder's
effects test. For example, Young v. New Haven Advocate, involved a Virginia prison
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warden's claims that he had been defamed by an article published by Connecticut
newspapers and posted on-line. The reporters knew that the subject of the story resided in
Virginia and made several calls into Virginia to gather information for the articles. The
lower court accepted the warden's claims that jurisdiction was proper because the
newspapers knew that the warden would be harmed in Virginia since he resided and
worked there. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the newspapers, "through the
Internet postings, [did not] manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers."
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002).
E.

POLICY REASONS COUNSEL AGAINST THE SINGLE EMAIL RULE

To find jurisdiction on the basis of one single un-targeted e-mail message alone
would require every single business operating over the Internet to be apprised of, and
comply with, a patchwork of state and international laws, even though a particular
business may not have purposefully directed any activity to those jurisdictions. This
requirement would place an untenable burden on businesses who only plan on conducting
business locally and who may lack the necessary resources to conduct their business on a
national scale. As stated by this Court:
It requires but a moment's reflection to see what practical difficulties could
result if the many thousands of retailers, who sell the many thousands of
products, which are transported into other states, were required to defend
wherever it might be alleged that the product had arrived and caused injury.
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1974).
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F.

EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT, T H E EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION WOULD B E CONTRARY TO TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY
AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

Even if the Court finds sufficient contacts between Mleads and the State of Utah,
Due Process further requires the Court to consider whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Arguello v.
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992). This inquiry
requires the Court to weigh (1) the burden on defendants; (2) the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient relief; (4) the
interest of the interstate system in the most efficient resolution of disputes; and (5) the
collective interests of states in furthering important substantive social policies.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S.
Ct. 559(1980).
1.

The burden on Mleads is substantial.

As recognized by the Court of Appeals, "traveling to Utah and hiring Utah counsel
to defend itself in this case undoubtedly burdens Mleads, a small, Arizona-based
company." Fenn, 2004 UT App 412, at p. 25. This factor weighs against reasonableness.
Additionally, the burden on the non-resident defendant must be viewed in light of the
importance of the conflict, which is often evidenced by the amount in controversy. Id.
Admittedly, Mleads would be significantly taxed by being required to litigate this claim in
Utah Courts. However, when viewed in the context of the amount in controversy (i.e., ten
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dollars ($10.00) per e-mail (see R. 2, Complaint ^ 12) the burden on Mleads becomes
unreasonable, and the exertion of personal jurisdiction contravenes traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
2.

The forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute.

The forum state has an obvious interest in ensuring resolution of a claim brought
by one of its citizens. In this case, however, two facts tip this factor against finding
jurisdiction. First, as noted below, the plaintiff in this case asserts a violation of statutory
rights and not an injury to person or property. Second, the Statute has since been repealed
by the Utah legislature (see Utah Repeal of Unsolicited Commercial or Sexually Explicit
Email Act, ch 278, § 1, 2004 Utah Laws 278), and Congress enacted a statute superseding
the Statute (15 U.S.C. § 7701, etseq. (the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003) (providing that it
"supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State
that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to
the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any
portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto"). These
developments show both a diminished state interest in resolving these types of claims and
a federal pronouncement that these types of claims are better regulated through federal
laws.
3.

The plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.

Fenn undoubtedly has an interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief with
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respect to her claims. However, "Fenn did not allege that she suffered any economic,
physical, emotional, or dignitary damages." Fenn, 2004 UT app 412, p2. Thus, the
strength of Fenn's interest is significantly less than it would have been if she were
seeking to vindicate personal injuries or reputational injuries.
4.

The interest of the interstate system in the most efficient resolution of
disputes.

This interest of the interstate system requires this case to be dismissed The
particular e-mail in question can subject Mleads to damages often dollars ($10.00). It
makes little sense from an efficiency standpoint to force Mleads to expend far in excess
of the amount of the claim to defend against the claim. A more efficient way to resolve
the dispute is to place the burden on the plaintiff who is then appropriately incentivized
(by the availability of attorney's fees) to bring the lawsuit or to refrain from doing so.
5.

The collective interests of states in furthering important substantive
social policies.

The repeal of the Statute and the enactment of federal legislation superseding the
Statute greatly diminish the interest of the State of Utah in furthering the social policies
the Statute targets. Instead, the facts of this case should be brought under statutes
compliant with the federal legislation, instead of under the repealed Statute.
Consequently, jurisdiction in Utah for this case is improper.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that Mleads is properly subject to
jurisdiction in the State of Utah on the basis of one single e-mail that "Mleads did not
know specifically . . . [would reach] Fenn or . . . any Utah resident." The Due Process
Clause requires purposeful availment. In this case, Mleads did not purposefully direct
any activity to Utah. Accordingly, Mleads respectfully requests this Court reverse the
judgment below and direct the Court of Appeals to enter an order affirming dismissal of
the Complaint by the trial court.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2005.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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APPENDIX A-l
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1.
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APPENDIX A-2
COPIES OF THE OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
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LEXSEE
Brittney Fenn, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. MLeads Enterprises, Inc.; and John Does I through X whose true names are
unknown, Defendants and Appellees.
Case No. 20030948-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2004 UTApp 412; 103 R3d 156; 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 37; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 452
November 12, 2004, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari granted
Fenn v. Meadst 2005 Utah LEXIS 42 (Utah, Mar. 17,
2005)
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Third District, Sandy
Department. The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg.
DISPOSITION: Dismissal vacated; remanded for further proceedings.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
COUNSEL: Daniel Garriott, Denver C. Snuffer Jr.,
Sandy, and Jesse L. Riddle, Draper, for Appellant.
Jill L. Dunyon, Salt Lake City, Derek A. Newman
and Venkat Balasubramani, Seattle, Washington, for
Appellees.
JUDGES: Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
OPINIONBY: JACKSON
OPINION: [**158] JACKSON, Judge:
[*P1] The district court dismissed Plaintiff Brittney
Fenn's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction; Fenn appeals. We vacate the dismissal and remand.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] MLeads Enterprises, Inc. (MLeads), an
Arizona corporation, contracted with a marketing agent
to advertise MLeads's services to consumers. In August
2002, Fenn, a Utah resident, received one unsolicited
email that advertised MLeads's services. MLeads did not
know specifically that the agent would send an email to
Fenn or to any Utah resident. The email did not include
"ADV:" in the subject line. Fenn brought suit against
MLeads pursuant to the Unsolicited Commercial and

Sexually Explicit Email Act (the Email Statute). See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 13-36-101 [***2] to-105 (Supp. 2003)
(repealed 2004). [**159] Fenn did not allege that she
suffered any economic, physical, emotional, or dignitary
damages.
[*P3] We must decide whether the state can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who caused one
unsolicited commercial email to be sent to a resident of
the state, nl This issue is a matter of first impression in
Utah and, as far as our research has revealed, in all of
the United States. Accordingly, to aid understanding of
the issue, we will describe the context in which this issue
arose.
nl Because the trial court disposed of this case
at an early stage, some important facts remain unresolved. Specifically, the parties dispute whether
Fenn had consented to receive the email in a previous visit to the website of a related entity and
whether MLeads or its marketing agent had any
means to discover the physical location or residency of the recipients of its email. The record
also contains no information as to the nature of
the agreement between MLeads and its marketing
agent.
We similarly have no information on whether
an automated system or an employee generated the
email. Simple software tools automate the process
by which email are created and transmitted, enabling companies to eliminate employee involvement after the initial programming.
[***3]
[*P4] In 1994, companies began to market via unsolicited email. See Elizabeth A. Alongi, Note, Has the U.S.
Canned Spam?, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 263, 263 (2004). Since
then, the rate at which companies use unsolicited email to
advertise has grown exponentially. See id. By 2003, fifty-
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512 Utah Adv. Rep. 37; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 452, ***
six percent "of all email traffic" was unsolicited commercial email. Id. It can be quite costly to Internet service
providers and corporations to receive massive volumes of
unsolicited email. See id. at 264.
[*P5] In response to the growing problem, in 1999,
Tennessee became the first state to require the characters
"ADV:" in the subject lines of unsolicited commercial
email. See Term. Code Ann. § 47-18-2501 (Supp. 1999).
Three years later, Utah codified the Email Statute. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-101 to-105 (repealed 2004).
The Email Statute required that unsolicited commercial
email include "ADV:" as the first four characters in the
subject line. See id. § 13-36-103(l)(b)(i) (repealed 2004).
The Email Statute allows for civil enforcement by permitting recipients to recover reasonable attorney fees and
[***4] costs in addition to the lesser of $10 per email or
$25,000 per day. See id. § 13-36-105(2) (repealed 2004).
[*P6] By 2002, when the legislature passed the Email
Statute, Utah became one of four states to have such legislation. See id.; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-2.5-103 (2000); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 50-6,107 (Supp. 2003); Tenn. Code Ann. §
47-18-2501 (Supp. 2003). Thus, Utah's requirement was
unusual but not unique, and such requirements had existed for three years by the time that Fenn received the
email in this case.
[*P7] Despite the four states' laws, the problem of unsolicited email continued. In 2003 and 2004, twelve other
states adopted legislation requiring "ADV:" in the subject line of unsolicited commercial email. n2 Finally, in
2003, Congress passed legislation regulating unsolicited
commercial email. See 75 U.S.C §§ 7701-1113 (Supp.
2004). The federal law aims primarily at fraudulent or
misleading email, rather than nonfraudulent, unsolicited
email, as is at issue here. See id. The federal law does not
require the "ADV:" text and preempts state statutes, such
as the Email Statute. See id. [***5]
n2 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1372.01
(Supp. 2004); 815 111. Comp. Stat. 511/10 (Supp.
2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1741.1 (Supp.
2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1497 (Supp.
2003); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 445.2503-.2508
(Supp. 2003); Minn. Stat. § 325F.694 (repealed
2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.1138 (Supp. 2003);
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-23 to-24 (Supp. 2003);
N.D. Cent. Code § 51-27-04 (Supp. 2003); 15 Okl.
St. Ann. § 776.6 (Supp. 2004); S.D. Codified Laws
§ 37-24-6(13) (Supp. 2003); Tex. Bus. & Comm.
Code Ann. § 46.003 (Supp. 2003).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[*P8] This case requires us to determine whether
a Utah court has authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose only contact with the state
was to employ an agent [***6] who sent one unsolicited
commercial email to a resident of Utah. Because this pretrial jurisdictional decision was made on documentary
evidence only, it presents only legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. See Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999
UT50,P2,980P2d204.
[**160] [*P9] The Email Statute has been superceded by federal law, see 75 U.S.C §§ 7701-1113
(Supp. 2004), and repealed by the Utah legislature, see
Utah Repeal of Unsolicited Commercial or Sexually
Explicit Email Act, ch. 278, § 1, 2004 Utah Laws 278.
However, during the time in which the statute was in effect, the lower court announced its decision. We review
the trial court's decision in light of the statutory scheme
in effect at the time, i.e., while the Email Statute was in
effect. See State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238,PP1, 41,
32P.3d976; Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751P.2d248,
249 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
ANALYSIS
[*P10] To exercise jurisdiction, (i) a Utah statute
must permit the court to exercise jurisdiction, and (ii) the
exercise ofjurisdiction must mcomport[] with due process
requirements of the Fourteenth [***7] Amendment.'"
Lee v. Frank's Garage & Used Cars, Inc., 2004 UT App
260,P7, 97 P3d 717 (quoting In re W.A., 2002 UT 127,
PI4, 63P3d607, cert, denied, 538 U.S. 1035, 155 L. Ed.
2d 1065 (2003)).
I. Statutory Requirement
[*P11] Fenn argues that the Email Statute itself impliedly confers jurisdiction because it creates a cause of
action. However, even assuming that Fenn preserved and
adequately briefed this point, the Utah Supreme Court
recently foreclosed this argument: "Liability and jurisdiction are independent. . . . [The statute] speaks to liability only and does not purport to grant personal jurisdiction. Nothing in the statutory language indicates that
the legislature intended to do so." MFS Series Trust III v.
Grainger, 2004 UT61,P21, 96 P.3d 927, 504 Utah Adv.
Rep. 7 (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, to convey
jurisdiction, a statute must do more than merely create a
cause of action.
[*P12] Fenn alternately argues that the state's longarm statute, Utah Code section 78-27-24 (1998), confers
personal jurisdiction over MLeads. The long-arm statute
provides:
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or
resident of [***8] this state, who in person
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or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself... to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to
any claim arising out of or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; . . . (3)
the causing of any injury within
this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(1 ),(3) (1998). Subsection
(1) applies to this situation because advertising in the
state qualifies as the "transaction of any business within
this state." n3 Id. § 78-27-24(1). In any event, "the Utah
long-arm statute 'must be extended to the fullest extenl
allowed by due process of law.'" Starways, 1999 UT 50
at P7 (quoting Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co
Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985)); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1969). Hence, whether the longarm statute provides jurisdiction in this case depends only
upon whether due process permits the exercise.

eral ways. Compare Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT
50,PP8, 11, 980 P.2d 204, with Parry v. Ernst Home
Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661-62 (Utah 1989). Most recently, Utah has applied a four-part analysis to the due
process inquiry. See, e.g., MFS Series Trust, 2004 UT
61 atPlO. Despite the differences in the organization and
structure, this four-part analysis makes fundamentally the
same queries as the other analyses.
[*P16] First, the court considers if the defendant
'"purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state.'" Id. (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed 2d 1283, 78 S.
Ct. 1228 (1958)) (other citation and alteration omitted).
Second, the court considers whether the claim arose out of
the defendant's Utah activity. See id. (citing Neways, Inc.
v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1997)). Third,
the court considers if the defendant "should [have been
able to] reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in
Utah. Id. (citing Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110) [***11]
(other citation omitted). Finally, the court considers the
state's interest and "fairness" to the parties. Id.
A. Purposeful Availment

n3 Whether subsection (3) applies depends on
whether a statutory violation constitutes an "injury." We decline to address that issue here.
r***Qi

II. Due Process
[*P13] A court can exercise two forms of personal
jurisdiction: (i) general and (ii) specific. See Phone
Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64,PU, 8
P. 3d 256. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Neways, Inc.
v. McCausland, 950P.2d420, 422 (Utah 1997). Fenn does
not allege that Utah could exercise general personal jurisdiction over MLeads. Thus, we consider only whether
Fenn established that the court could exercise specific
personal jurisdiction.
[*P14] A democratic government must exercise its
powers against only those who have in some way assented to the governmental power, such as by pursuing
the benefits available in the forum. Accordingly, due process requires that the defendant have "minimum contacts"
with the forum jurisdiction [**161] "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.'" MFS Series Trust,
2004 UT 61 at PP9,10 (quoting International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 US. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S Ct.
154 (1945)).
[•PIS] Courts previously have articulated [***10]
the framework of personal jurisdiction analysis in sev-

[*P17] Under the first prong, a state may exercise
jurisdiction only against a defendant who has "purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum." n4
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 472, 85
L. Ed 2d 528, 105 S Ct. 2174 (1985) (quotations and citation omitted). For example, the United States Supreme
Court deemed a defendant's activities "purposefully directed" when a corporation placed products in '"the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State' and those products subsequently injured consumers." Id. at 473 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297-98, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980)).
Likewise, the Court deemed a magazine publisher's activities "purposefully directed" when the publisher distributed a defamatory story in the forum. See Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 79 L. Ed. 2d
790, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); see also Calder v. Jones,
465 US. 783, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984)).
[***12]
n4 We recognize that a status exception exists
to this rule, but it is inapplicable in this case. See
In re W.A., 2002 UT 127, 63 P.3d607, cert, denied,
538 U.S. 1035, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1065 (2003).
[*P18] In a similar vein, in a case in which the
defendants allegedly made defamatory statements to individuals in Utah and caused libelous facsimiles to be sent
to Utah, the Utah Supreme Court held that a court prop-
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erly exercised jurisdiction. See Starways, 1999 UT 50
at PP5, 12. Moreover, email contacts alone can establish
jurisdiction when the contacts are extremely numerous.
See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F Supp. 2d
601 (E.D. Va. 2002); Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138
E Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (involving millions of
email); Washington v. Heckel, 122 Wn. App. 60, 93 P. 3d
189, 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (involving millions of
email but not directly addressing personal jurisdiction).
[*P19] The Utah [***13] Supreme Court noted
in dicta in Starways that Utah could not properly exercise jurisdiction against a defendant who "did not cause"
communications "to be transmitted into Utah but did send
them elsewhere . . . [even if the defendant could have]
reasonably forseen that a copy would end up in Utah."
Starways, 1999 UT 50 at PI2 n.3. "Such an attenuated
nexus would not be sufficient, standing alone, to justify
the imposition of personal jurisdiction—" Id. Thus, foreseeable but undirected contacts cannot justify a court's
exercise of jurisdiction.
[**162] [*P20] This case incorporates aspects of
both the circumstances hypothesized in Starways and the
intentional availment of forum markets in World-Wide
Volkswagen but is not squarely on point with either case.
In this case, unlike World-Wide Volkswagen, MLeads
did not place a "product" into the stream of commerce.
Moreover, Fenn does not allege that the email caused
any reputational, economic, emotional, or physical "injury." On the other hand, unlike the hypothetical situation
posited in Starways, MLeads did cause the communications to come into Utah.
[*P21] The extent to which the defendant [***14]
caused the result is the more important aspect of the analysis. MLeads caused its agent to send email, and the agent
sent an email to Fenn, who is a resident of Utah. The
record does not disclose whether the agent sent a large
volume of email all over the country or whether it sent
one email to Fenn specifically. In either case, MLeads
directed its agent to solicit business, and that direction
instantiates the purpose that makes the connection more
than an "attenuated nexus."
B. Reasonably Anticipate Being Haled Into Court n5
n5 We dispense with the second query of the
minimum contacts test because Fenn's claim clearly
arose out of activity in Utah.
[*P22] Under the next prong of our analysis, for
a court to exercise jurisdiction, "defendants' 'conduct
and connection with the forum State must be such that
they should [have been able to] reasonably anticipate

being haled into court there.'" Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., 701 P2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US. 286, 297, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980)) [***15] (alterations
omitted). This inquiry closely parallels the purposeful
availment test: courts have exercised jurisdiction against
a defendant whose activity was directed toward the forum
state. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has held that a court may exercise jurisdiction in
a defamation case in which the defendant mailed a single
letter into the forum. See Burt v. Board of Regents, 757
K2d242, 244-45 (10th Cir. 1985).
[*P23] Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction against a defendant who
sent email to a recipient in Arkansas. See Kirwan v.
Arkansas, 351 Ark. 603, 96S.W.3d724, 731 (Ark. 2003)
(discussing territorial jurisdiction over a criminal defendant). The statute at issue in Kirwan made it illegal to
"distribute," "ship," or "exchange" certain materials. Id.
The court reasoned that the objectionable conduct was delivery of the email and thus that the conduct occurred in
Arkansas, even if the email were sent from another state.
See id. In the case at hand, the Email Statute made it illegal to "send[]M noncompliant email "to an email address
held by a resident of [Utah]. [***16] " Utah Code Ann.
§ 13-36-103(1). In this context, "send" and "ship" are
synonyms, and thus the conduct at issue here occurred in
Utah, even if the "sending" was done from another state.
n6
n6 Without commenting on the adequacy of
such a claim in Utah, we also recognize that a
federal district court in Virginia exercised jurisdiction on the basis that the out-of-state defendants
accessed the Internet through an Internet service
provider headquartered in Virginia. See Bochan v.
La Fontaine, 68 F Supp. 2d 692, 695-96, 699 (E.D.
Va. 1999).
[*P24] In contrast, courts have held jurisdiction to
be improper where a defendant maintains only passive
contact with the forum, as through posting a static internet website. See Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered
Bank, 196 F3d 1292, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 1999); Patriot
Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 132324 (D. Utah 1998). Sending an email to a forum requires
more purpose than maintaining a passive internet [*** 17]
website, however. Thus, MLeads should have anticipated
being haled into court wherever its email were received,
even in Utah.
C. State's Interest and Fairness
[*P25] To assess the final prong of our analysis and
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determine whether jurisdiction would offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice,"
generally, a court weighs: (1) the burden on
the defendants; (2) the forum state's [**163]
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief; (4) the interest of the
interstate system in the most efficient resolution of disputes; and (5) the collective interests of states in furthering important substantive social policies.
Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 779
(S.D. Miss. 2001) (citation omitted). First, traveling to
Utah and hiring Utah counsel to defend itself in this case
undoubtedly burdens MLeads, a small, Arizona-based
company.
[*P26] Second, by virtue of the fact that its legislature enacted this statute, Utah demonstrates an interest
in preventing its residents from receiving noncompliant email. Yet, this interest can be recognized honestly
[***18] only as relatively minor. Fenn did not allege
any injury. Fenn alleged that she received one statute violative email from MLeads. Utah has since repealed
this statute, and Congress did not include the text requirement in the federal legislation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77017713. Further, when courts have found that personal jurisdiction did exist to enforce similar legislation against
nonresident defendants, the cases involved allegations of
fraud and millions of email, which are not alleged here.
n7 See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp.
2d 601, 601 (E.D. Va. 2002); Internet Doorway, 138 F.
Supp. 2d at 774\ Washington v. Heckel, 122 Wn. App.
60, 93 P.3d 189, 191-92, 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
Nonetheless, Utah has an interest in the enforcement of
its statutes for the benefit of its residents.
n7 Also, two of these cases were brought by
Internet service providers, who suffer significantly
more injury than an individual email recipient. See
Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp.
2d 601, 604 (E.D. Va. 2002); Internet Doorway,
Inc. v. Parks, 138 F Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Miss.
2001).
r***|oi

[*P27] Third, Fenn has an economic interest in this
lawsuit. The statute provided that the recipient of an unsolicited email could recover actual damages, or $10 per
unsolicited email to a maximum of $25,000 for each day

that the violation occurred, as well as costs and attorney
fees. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105. Because Fenn
pleaded no damages and received only one unsolicited
email from MLeads, she could recover $10. n8
n8 This assumes that because Fenn is not a
lawyer she is ineligible to share the proceeds of the
attorney fees award pursuant to rule 5.4 of the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Utah R. Prof 1
Conduct 5.4(a).
[*P28] Moreover, while the test here does not explicitly consider the possible benefits to the plaintiffs attorney, the Email Statute's award of attorney fees reflects the
Utah Legislature's interest in encouraging private parties,
such as Fenn, to enforce this statute. Because Utah benefits from its attorneys earning fees and Fenn benefits from
having [***20] attorneys who will represent her rights,
such benefits should be considered.
[*P29] Fourth, in considering "the interest of the
interstate system in the most efficient resolution of disputes," Internet Doorways, 138 F Supp. 2d at 779, we
recognize that if we affirm the dismissal of this case, Fenn
likely will have no recourse. n9 Such a dismissal may be
an efficient resolution, but a dismissal would abandon the
fifth factor, the "important substantive social policies" at
issue in this case. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the interests of Utah and Fenn in prosecuting this case outweigh
the burden placed on MLeads. Thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case is fair and comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
n9 Fenn probably would not have a claim under federal law, common law, or the laws of the
states that arguably have more connection to the
activities at issue here. The federal CAN-SPAM
law was not in effect at the time and probably
would not be implicated in this situation. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 7701-7113 (Supp. 2004). Further, Fenn
may have brought a common law trespass to chattel
claim, but a successful claim would require Fenn
to prove actual damages. See Intel v. Hamidi, 30
Cal. 4th 1342, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 71 P.3d 296
(Cal. 2003); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94
Cal. App. 4th 1255, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d258, 261 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002). Arizona, where MLeads is based,
did not have a similar statute in effect at the time
of this email, and its current statute provides for
enforcement through the attorney general only. See
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1372.01 (Supp. 2004) (effective Sept. 18, 2003). Florida, where MLeads's
marketing agent is based, has no similar provision.
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[***21]
[**164] CONCLUSION
[*P30] Sending one email to a resident of Utah is
sufficient "contact" to satisfy the long-arm statute and
the minimum contacts requirement of due process for a
statutory claim arising from the sending of that email.
Additionally, the state's and Fenn's interests in this case
trump the burdens imposed upon MLeads. Thus, we hold
that the district court ruled incorrectly in dismissing this
case on summary judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. We vacate the dismissal and remand for such

proceedings as may now be appropriate.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
[*P31] I CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
[*P32] I DISSENT:
Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge
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